I took a deep dive into the code.
I respect what you’re trying to do but this feels like a solution in search of a problem.
The kind of markets this would tailor towards already have their own escrow management systems.
I do, however, see this being relevant to MLS and the Housing industry. It’s a shady industry with scammy ads and “handyman special” vibes from people trying to sell legitimate and illegitimate listings.
This is just a more elaborate form of an escrow contract.
There's absolutely no need to make a new L1 for that: you can use existing smart contract/dapp platforms, plug into existing stable coin rails, etc.
Interesting but how would this prevent against “off-chain” collusion? A fraudulent seller captures brokers on the buy and sell side? Seller backs out of the deal unless they know who the brokers are?
I think this kind of behavior in principle would be detectable but in principle with enough concentration in the market, a fraudulent seller could in practice get brokers and jurors to collude with them.
https://claude.ai/public/artifacts/0824e5b9-7d75-45f1-87f4-3...
This is now my favorite way to visualize these concepts in practice.
Four critique points:
- Who wants to drive across town to inspect a €50 item for a small fee (we can draw comparison to Uber Eats like platforms fees economies)?
- Can a random broker validate a luxury watch? Do we need another blockchain tech for broker validator skill reputation?
- Physical validation adds days to trades, in online economy, the faster the merrier
- Fees might price out low-value items
Let's see how this plays out.
Thanks for the critique! Here’s a breakdown of the points raised:
-Who wants to drive across town to inspect a €50 item? The focus is on mid to high-value, preferably niche items. Lower-value goods often don’t justify the costs involved in driving and the time spent on validation.
-Can a random broker validate a luxury watch? Not all brokers have the necessary expertise to validate every item, especially luxury goods. The proposal is to enhance the current system by assigning brokers based on item categories. This specialization will be particularly effective when there are enough brokers for specific categories, such as watches.
- Physical validation adds days to trades. While physical validation can slow things down, brokers who fail to validate effectively will phase out over time, ensuring that only those with the right expertise remain. It should be economically infeasible to accept assignment, where you have no expertise. This approach aims to streamline the validation process.
-Fees might price out low-value items. Focusing on mid to high-value items helps avoid the issue of fees pricing out lower-value goods.
Additionally, this idea is designed to integrate into existing niches where validation matters significantly, like trading cards, electronics, watches, and sneakers. Numerous businesses already specialize in validating these items and have the necessary expertise to navigate legal requirements.
> ensuring that only those with the right expertise remain
How will this ensure waning/gaining expertise is accurately represented/fostered? Wouldn't you rather attract a steady-stream of experts indefinitely?
In practice, anyone with sufficient funds can become a broker. The pseudo-random selection process means that the probability of Broker A being chosen to audit or inspect an item is positive. If Broker A accepts and validates an item they are unfamiliar with, regardless of its actual validity, the likelihood of a dispute arising increases. Since Broker A lacks knowledge about the item, proving their case becomes challenging, potentially resulting in financial losses. Over time, this situation should lead to a pool of brokers with expertise. Consequently, the system is likely to attract a continuous stream of experts, as expertise will prove itself financially advantageous.
If A could gain sufficient funds through expertise in one area (by way of validating contracts), could it feign/game expertise in area B by having enough funds to recoup the losses from disputes? Or would such a situation be prevented?
This smells AI generated, sorry
May I ask how you generated this?
AI but does it matter, no
Thanks for sharing your opinion
In 3.1, rejecting (R) fraudulent (F) goods resulting in 0 for the seller is a strong assumption. There are all kinds of possible negatives (typically risks of legal fees) for storage costs of fraudulent goods in the game of hot potato. It might be worth your time to look into the literature a bit more.
The paper was aimed at a broader audience, which is why it simplifies some concepts and makes certain assumptions. While there are potential drawbacks to consider, it’s reasonable to assume that a seller of a fraudulent item gains nothing if the item gets rejected. In that scenario, their goal of making money wouldn’t be achieved, and any additional losses wouldn’t significantly impact the protocol. In fact it would deter fraudsters. I'd love to hear more thoughts on this!
Heatware.com solved this years ago without all the crypto bs.
Why not build it on top of EVM?
I chose to build an L1 for several reasons. One major factor is the desire for fair currency distribution. Additionally, I wanted to ensure instant finality to prevent block reverts during trades.
What in EVM smart contracts prevent any of this?