The idea that people in e.g. Asia don't tend to consider outside viewpoints as much as Americans is so absurd I'm not even sure what to say. If anything it's the opposite, but Westerners are too full of themselves to notice. It would require a genuine interest and to a degree immersion in foreign cultures. Prevailing Western ideology does not permit for that.
To give just one example, people in China know much more about the US and its culture than vice versa. If America were really a questioning culture, it would be reversed.
Any suggestions for entry points into chinese culture (beyond the 1961 大闹天宫)?
As an american, who had never met anyone from a Warsaw Pact* country until the very late 1980s, I was very amused to run across a bemulleted late soviet boy band video (1988?) prominently including a Dick Dale and the Deltones t-shirt: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dezX61f3Ycg&t=87s
* I had played Tetris and with Rubik's Cube, so there was a small amount of cultural influence coming the other way
Brin isn’t making any point about knowledge- in fact acquiring unfiltered knowledge of the other is a risky move in the dogma of otherness, as you may find something you don’t like. Knowing something about the other that you don’t like is of course devastating to your social status. His central example of the dolphins clearly demonstrates this distinction- the dolphin scientists are not popular with the crowd.
> The idea that people in e.g. Asia don't tend to consider outside viewpoints as much as Americans is so absurd I'm not even sure what to say.
That is indeed an absurd idea. Fortunately, that's not what he wrote. He wrote that considering all points of view to have merit is a liberal Western value.
>> 'There's always another way of looking at things' is a basic assumption of a great many Americans... as a truly pervasive set of assumptions, it's pretty much a liberal Western, even American, tradition..."
At least, it was more true in 1986. Now the pendulum seems to be swinging away.
Do you mean some city folk or people in the hinterlands who’ve never seen any kind of foreigner ever in their lives?
I would think most are familiar with American television, or other cultural symbols like Coca Cola. Regardless of where they live.
Whether or not that equates to understanding American culture I can't say..
My daughter [in Argentina] knows more about Halloween than about the local Independence Day. Every kids show in Netflix has a special episode about Halloween.
There are companies in germany that sell red plastic cups in case you wish to throw an "American" theme party.
That’s great; we also have “Oktoberfests” and drink from big mugs. What does that mean; we know German politics or at least royal traditions?
That means that, beyond all the movies, although germans have been watching Dallas, The Denver Clan, The Duke Brothers, etc. I doubt their american counterparts have been watching DSDS, Die Rosenheim-Cops, GZSZ, etc.
They're not buying red cups because they've heard about them, or have seen them on product tie-ins; they buy them because all the american media they consume includes them, and they stand out as something particularly american.
This not an apt comparison. Else we could say American kids know more about Anime than about our Independence Day. Kids like kid things.
I doubt people in the Podunks of interior China have much awareness of what the US is about other than what their official propaganda tells them.
This sounds like an easily testable proposition... (for someone with better hanzi-fu than I?)
EDIT: ok, so I was just on douyin.com (seeded with what deepl told me were "farmer" and "opinion of american people") and there's a fair amount of official line delivered by news commentators, a fair amount of not-the-best-of-the-Old-Country phone footage that's been helpfully subtitled in chinese, and not infrequent tubes of chinese-on-the-street commenting about the US or interviews in the US, eg https://www.douyin.com/video/7253009716257836347
(the latter two categories are easy to spot because they've been subtitled in english as well as chinese, but I'm most curious about if the people standing in front of tractors while speaking their bit are ranting as their stateside counterparts often seem to be?)
Anyone with better language skills have a better site, or better query?
EDIT2: finally found the deep link: just click to dismiss the QR code popup; no idea what that may be...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/We_Have_Never_Been_Modern
A book for those who are interested in this viewpoint; though, its a bit technical, its audience is anthropologists.
I agree and disagree, in that, the concept of the "other," which Brin subtly attributes to a crude reading of Hegel, is misused in contemporary academia, in contemporary culture, to create these what can't be said to be other than corruptive ideas like an infinite meakness in the face of what we cannot know about ourselves, but a meakness which is secretly all the more chauvinistic, as it claims, above all, that only we are superior who recognize our "mediocrity," in the face of all those animals, cultures, potentialities of otherness, that fail to do so themselves.
But, of course, Hegel's concept of the "other" is not this way at all. As JN Findlay argued, there is no substantial difference between Godel and Hegel's logic in terms of incompleteness: it is likely that, although the only philosophy which Godel ever adopted was Phenomenology, he would himself not have had any issues with the comparison. It is the "identity of non-identity," its not that you "encounter" the other, its the recognition that the other is already contained in what is non-other; which is to say, in a manner that Godel expressed far more clearly, that all logical systems, all systematic programs, contain elements that cannot be contained in the system, and the discreteness of the world only comes when those elements come to a head, when people are forced to, for Hegel, fight in a conflict to resolve, at the level of the Idea itself, what they cannot be certain of: this is why, science, what you'd think is objective and independent, depends on massive political and social forces: and if the Israeli's, for instance, could not fight their wars, it would be the proof that ideology of faith is more powerful than the ideology of the world, of technological power. The "truth" of a missile only becomes apparent when it hits its target, just in the same way that one cannot know, here on HN especially, how others will think of their comment, until they post it.
> which is to say, in a manner that Godel expressed far more clearly, that all logical systems, all systematic programs, contain elements that cannot be contained in the system
Wikipedia [1] summarizes better than I could:
"The first incompleteness theorem states that no consistent system of axioms whose theorems can be listed by an effective procedure (i.e. an algorithm) is capable of proving all truths about the arithmetic of natural numbers. For any such consistent formal system, there will always be statements about natural numbers that are true, but that are unprovable within the system.
The second incompleteness theorem, an extension of the first, shows that the system cannot demonstrate its own consistency."
That's seems a bit different than what you stated, to me at least.
[1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%2527s_incompleten...
Indeed. Godel's theorem is very technical, and any use outside the very technical realm of its immediate application should be viewed with great suspicion.
For example, if you take the statement you quoted from Wikipedia and replace "natural number" with "real number", it doesn't work anymore: it's been proven that the arithmetic of real numbers is decidable[1]. That means that the sentence you quoted from OP's comment is not true.
Anyone inclined to use Godel's theorem in these philosophical contexts should maybe read the great little book "Gödel’s Theorem: An Incomplete Guide to Its Use and Abuse" by Torkel Franzén. I'll leave here a quote from a review[2]:
In addition to obvious nonsense, there are among the nonmathematical ideas inspired by Gödel’s theorem many that by no means represent postmodernist excesses, but rather come to mind naturally to many people with very different backgrounds when they think about the theorem. It is especially such naturally occurring misunderstandings that Franzén intends to correct.
It was Brin, not me, who makes the connection, and says that Godel refutes Hegel. The scholar I mentioned, JN Findlay, has a rigorous understanding of both authors, but I couldn't quickly find an article where he makes the argument. Nothing to do with "postmodernist excesses" or whatever.
Also read my comment, see this article here[0] about how Godel adopted phenomenology, which is the philosophical backbone of much of "postmodernism," so it would be entirely fair to make a connection between Godel and, say, Derrida, for instance, since they both claim to be in the same philosophical tradition. But that's just what the scholarly evidence suggests.
In any case, Godel's proof has little to do with "math" in the sense of calculation but rather is a refutation of Russel & Whiteheads attempts at a logical foundation of mathematics, which is a philosophical endeavour. The mathematical aspect is secondary and merely follows from the philosophical argument which it entails. It is the simply the case that, Russel & Whitehead were themselves engaging with "Hegel" in Principia Mathematica, who of course had his own system of logic (cf. the Science of Logic), but they failed insofar as Godel's critique is accepted, and insofar as you accept Godel's critique you could make the inference (though by no means on an entirely solid basis) that Godel's work constitutes, in a certain sense, a re-interpretation of Hegel, though not directly.
[0]https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel/goedel-phenomenolo...
> Nothing to do with "postmodernist excesses" or whatever.
To clarify, I wasn't implying you or Brin were commiting "postmodernist excesses". The part of the review I quoted was explicitly saying that the book aims to correct misunderstandings that "by no means represent postmodernist excesses, but rather come to mind naturally to many people with very different backgrounds".
Plato’s Republic was more fun and engaging than other foundational philosophy texts I read as an undergraduate because the dialogue format made me want to interrupt Socrates in way that I don’t usually experience when I read things that I disagree with. It activates the conversation lobes of my brain or something I guess, it’s simultaneously frustrating and satisfying.
Anyway, the introduction to this article does the same thing.
Mostly tangential, but in mathematics, there are sometimes "canonical" objects, typically a 'natural' viewpoint which is proven to be unique and sometimes also 'universal' in a sense. So, in many cases, you can rigorously prove "this is the one 'best' way" (in some sense of best (in some theory)).
A top-of-mind example is how a tuple `(A, B)` is "obviously" the (minimal) way you would have both objects A and B within one object: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Product_(category_theory)
I find it interesting that the author mentions "nonscientists", as those seem less likely to be equipped with the experiences of simple/well-defined problems with "global optima". And in mathematics, the "what if there were another way" questions get followed by "suppose there were another way _W_...".
> A top-of-mind example is how a tuple `(A, B)` is "obviously" the (minimal) way you would have both objects A and B within one object
I am confused as to what that means. A and B are most likely one of the thousands of possible modelisations for an abstract concept I am trying to model.
Say I want to model a point on a plane, I could decide to model it as carthesian coordinates in an (A, B) tuple, or a single complex number as a scalar. The _best_ representation depending on how I plan to use that point later on.
Complex numbers are just tuples of real numbers with some rules how to add and multiply them.
This seems quite appropriate listening to half wits like Joe Rogan giving equal weight to an expert in a given topic and then cutting away unashamedly to some fruitloop with a theory that would make a sane person blush.
I'll never get accustomed to the arrogance of people hating on the intelligence of some of the most successful people in their field.
I don't have to like JR and I'd be surprised if he wasn't a CIA asset to influence public perception, but outright calling him a half wit is more telling about you and than him. Your reliance on titles and certified experts just exposes what's wrong in a post-COVID and post-truth world.
I think it comes from a long experience of just how stupid people often are despite all of their success. While many certified experts are also often quite idiotic, particularly when talking even slightly outside their fields, or when parroting dogma within their field, there really seems to be almost no correlation between public success and what we'd normally call being smart.
David Brin is a great sci-fi author too by the way. One of the few who've written about dolphins flying a spaceship.
Pretty nice guy, too. Back in the early-mid 90s I was a teenager and got on some kind of David Brin fan site (this may have been on Prodigy it was so long ago), where the man himself would sometimes reply. He once responded to a message I posted, and it just about made my year.
He's an expert in dolphin cognition, he's said so himself. Also notice the "Ph.D." he put after his name? Don't look up what that's in though, else you might wonder what astronomy and electrical engineering have to do with dolphins.
>"I'm not a real expert," I tell them. "But the data are pretty easy to interpret. I'm afraid real dolphins simply aren't all that smart.
I really liked Startide Rising for its spacefaring dolphins, particularly how their attitudes contrasted with Humans' and the other uplifted or alien species – great concept overall, playful and sometimes poetic. And ‘Earth’ also had some great concepts and predictions, if you discount the global war against Switzerland. I didn’t like ‘Existence’, because (to me) the structure and characters seemed primarily to be a vehicle for Brin to make impassioned points about humanity. They may be good thought-provoking points, but they killed any suspense.
YMMV
I think this is more abstractly expressed by Lewis' Convention book.
"Dogmas" as fulfilled expectation about other's expectation's expectation (and so on recursively ad infinitum).
Necessary, in Lewis opinion, to solve coordination problems.
I think that humanistic moral universalism (or simply humanism) - a moral philosophy which is a basis for e.g. Universal Declaration of Human Rights - requires the moral axiom that "not hurting humans is above all else".
This obviously begs a question "who is considered a human?" in this moral philosophy. For this to work as intended, things like human cells (we can kill cells to save a human being) or societies like nation states (we can destroy or mutilate states to save a human being) have to be considered lesser than individual humans.
But it gives rise to Russell-type paradox of how to include as many humans as possible without creating contradictions. (A similar problem is with democracy, it cannot be instituted or destroyed democratically.) These logical problems seem to come from the fact that you need some axioms at all. In the same way, you can be "dogmatic in your non-dogmatism".
I also think if you accept the universalist moral position above, the questioning and distrust towards experts (authorities) becomes obvious conclusion. Authorities asking for humans to be killed or harmed (for example, going to a war) need to provide a strong justification.
I also consider it very doubtful that the moral universalism was first invented by "Western civilization" or "enlightenment". Yeah, somebody was first, but it's not that a difficult idea. What might be new is the universal acceptance of it, but I am not so sure when I look around.
However, in practice, the Russell-style paradox is rarely a problem. Yeah, there are edge cases like dolphins, or intellectually disabled people, but mostly we can figure it out.
> [moral relativism is] not that a difficult idea
Eg Aristotle (ca 300BC): Some people think that all rules of justice are merely conventional, because whereas a law of nature is immutable and has the same validity everywhere, as fire burns both here and in Persia, rules of justice are seen to vary.
I'd guess it was common over the last 10k years for educated and/or travelled people to be aware that their neighbours had different* dogmas, and in pre-colonial times (when it was far more likely that these neighbours were similarly located on the tech tree) the parochialism of colonialists ("Whatever happens, we have got / The Maxim gun, and they have not.") would not have been as facile.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%...
* Tacitus seems to have written De origine et situ Germanorum partly as an objective description of germans, and partly as a subjective reproach of his Roman compatriots; during the XIX (which established many of the tropes we've inherited as "common knowledge") the germans flipped this around: germans and french were in superpower conflict, and as the french —with a significant advantage in language— had laid claim to inheriting the (centralised) Roman tradition, the germans retorted by digging up all the old arguments the (decentralised) greeks had made along the lines of "maybe the Romans have all the money, but we've got all the culture".
(cf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanns_Johst#Schlageter ; τὰ πάντα ῥεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει )
> > [moral relativism is] not that a difficult idea
Actually I mean moral universalism here, but thanks for your comment.
My bad. For moral universalism, how about https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jainism#Non-violence_(ahimsa) for an older example? (although their protected class is a bit wider than humanity)
Looks like it goes back a ways, either infinitely (if you ask the Jains) or at least thousands of years (if you ask current historians), but both agree to further back than the Age of Pisces covered by Brin's essay: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parshvanatha#Historicity
my lagniappe for you today is 兼愛 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mohism/#inclusive which probably you are familiar with but have forgotten
(1986)
“Answer truthfully. You all believe that widely diverse points of view have merit, right?"
Nope.
Not all orderings are total: just as {A} is a subset of {A,B} and {A,C} but neither {A,B} nor {A,C} are subsets of the other, one can consistently hold the position that point of view A is inferior in merit to points of view AB and AC while neither of AB or AC are inferior to the other.
Sure. In many cases {A} isn’t a subset of anything else, though, and is merely what we might call standalone bullshit, and unfortunately it’s pretty prevalent these days.